Japanese Political Parties: Ideals and Reality by Gerald Curtis
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-005
Japanese Political Parties: Ideals and Reality
Gerald CURTIS
RIETI
The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-005 
 
 









Japanese political reformers embrace an image of the modern political 
party system that was modern in the early twentieth century but problematic 
in the early twenty-first century.  The idea that politics should be conducted 
under a two-party format and that voters should ignore issues of candidate 
personality and constituency service and make their voting choices on the 
basis of party manifestos does not reflect political reality in any modern 
democracy. Political reformers would be better advised to focus on how to 
strengthen the prime minister vis-à-vis his own cabinet and own party and 
how to restructure the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians.   
Constantly chasing after a model of the modern party system that is 
unrealistic and unrealizable only contributes to reinforcing public cynicism 
about the political process. 
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* A  Japanese version of this article is scheduled to be published by Daiichi Houki 
publishing company in volume six of a six volume series on the history of Japanese 
political parties entitled Gendai Nihon Seitou Shiroku.  
Introduction 
 
There has been a remarkable continuity in Japanese thinking about what constitutes a 
modern political party and a desirable political party system.  Since this cherished model 
of party politics stands in stark contrast to the realities of Japanese politics, political 
reformers in Japan have repeatedly championed reforms that they claim would bring the 
reality of Japanese politics into closer alignment with the ideal model of what party 
politics should be. These reform efforts, however, invariably have failed to produce the 
promised results, thus creating a situation in which high expectations are followed by 
deep disappointment and by the renewed conviction that Japanese politics is hopelessly 
backward.  Despite repeated failure, however, it takes only a few years for the reform 
effort to gather energy once again. The process then repeats itself, only to end but one 
more time in failure. 
       The Japanese ideal model of the modern party was formulated in the 1920’s during 
the period of Taisho Democracy when British political practices were held up as the 
model of modern parliamentary democracy. Ironically, the British themselves are far less 
wedded to this model today than are the Japanese. In Japan the model of the “modern” 
political party  has been frozen in time.  It has led many people to believe with what only 
can be described as a kind of religious conviction that if Japan would simply adopt the 
right reform it could turn that model into reality. 
       The model is familiar to virtually all Japanese.  It is constantly being invoked by 
politicians, scholars and the mass media as a way to describe what is wrong with 
Japanese political reality.  In this model, parties have mass memberships, clear principles, 
and social bases of support that differentiate them from other parties.  In this ideal system, 
voters support parties on the basis of the policies they propose rather than on the basis of 
the personalities of their candidates. Parties offer the voters clear alternative policy 
agendas and the parties themselves are well organized and centralized.   
       There is no room in this ideal model for constituency service or for voter loyalty to 
candidates rather than to party.  Moreover, in this model of modern politics, a two-party 
system prevails and election campaigns are inexpensive and party controlled.        The reality of Japanese politics could hardly be at greater variance with this model.  
Election campaigns are expensive and they are dominated by the individual candidates 
and their koenkai rather than by the party. This remains the case even under the 
predominantly single member district system that Japan adopted in 1994. Party 
identification is weak and there is a notable absence of deep social cleavages to 
differentiate the social bases of the major parties. Party factions, though weaker today 
than they were in the past, continue to be important. The party organization at the local 
level is indistinguishable from the personal koenkai organizations of the party’s elected 
politicians. One party dominance until 1993 and coalition government since then has 
characterized Japan rather than an alternation of power between two parties. Many 
Japanese seem to believe that this reality stands in stark contrast to what a modern party 
system should be, and that it presents uniquely Japanese problems.  
       In fact, however, the model itself is hopelessly outdated and the effort to make it 
reality in Japan doomed to fail.  The model of the programmatic party with many party 
members in competition with other similarly organized parties representing different 
social groups and proposing different sets of policies is a model of democratic politics of 
the early part of the twentieth century. It is not a model relevant to politics in the early 
part of the twenty-first century. 
 
Emergence of the “Modern” Political Party  
 
       The first modern parties emerged a century ago, in the midst of industrialization, 
before the advent of the welfare state and before the invention of television and the 
emergence of the mass media.  They organized voters for political participation in 
societies that were characterized by deep class conflicts and oftentimes by religious and 
regional conflicts as well.  Parties on the left, lacking the financial resources of parties 
that had the backing of business, found their strength in the large number of people who 
joined them.  This organizational model proved so effective that soon conservative 
parties were emulating it. Mass membership programmatic parties reflecting the deep 
social cleavages of early twentieth century Europe became the model for “modern” 
parties.          By the 1920s, when Japanese political parties were growing more powerful and when 
the political system seemed to many to be moving in the direction of European 
parliamentary democracy, this European model of the modern party system was at its 
zenith.  Almost all of the goals Japanese political reformers today espouse were defined 
in that period: a two party system, a single member election district system, mass 
membership parties, a commitment to implement a clear party platform sharply 
differentiated from the platforms of other parties, a focus on issues of high national 
purpose rather than local constituency service, and so on. 
       In the early part of the twenty-first century there is much less need for what Japanese 
define to be the modern party than there was a hundred years ago. Mass membership 
provided funds for the parties, but Japan and other countries today provide public 
subsidies to political parties.  Many of them, with the notable exception of the United 
States, also make some political activities, such as candidate election campaign 
advertising in the mass media, free of charge to candidates and parties. Political parties in 
the first half of the twentieth century, with their party newspapers and party meetings, 
provided an important channel for communication between the leadership and party 
members. There is much less need for the party to use its organizational apparatus as a 
means for communicating to the voters now that the mass media is so pervasive.   
              Most importantly, in predominantly middle class societies where welfare state 
policies have dulled the sharp edges of earlier class conflicts, it is extremely difficult for 
political parties that seek parliamentary majorities to sharply differentiate themselves 
from each other in terms of their ideological and basic policy positions.  A German 
political scientist, Otto Kircheimer, writing in the 1950s, coined the phrase “catch-all 
party” to describe the fundamental change in political party organization and behavior 
that had resulted from the introduction of the welfare state and the amelioration of class 
differences in European democracies.  The catch-all party does not identify a particular 
social group as its core constituency. It seeks the support of all the voters. In a party 
system characterized by the presence of two or more catch all parties, the major parties 
will have much in common in terms of their basic policies. Each will try to appeal to the 
floating voter, that is the independent voter who is somewhere in the middle and 
potentially a supporter for either of the catch all parties.          If parties in a two-party system take diametrically opposing positions on fundamental 
national and international issues then it is safe to assume that they are operating in a 
deeply divided and polarized society. This was the situation in Japan in the first decade of 
the ’55 system. Japan was divided into antagonistic conservative and progressive camps 
led respectively by the LDP and the JSP. It was a polarized two-party system but that is 
hardly the image political reformers have in mind when they stress the desirability of 
two-party politics.  But if the society is not deeply divided, then there is no reason to 
expect two parties, each of which is seeking majority support, to take decisively different 
positions on issues of major importance. 
       This reality is why in Britain today, unlike Britain a hundred years ago, differences 
between the Labour and Conservative Parties tend to be subtle rather than fundamental.  
Tony Blair, the voice of “new Labour,” is a voice of moderation and a leader who claims 
to rule on behalf of all the people in Britain and not primarily the working class.  A 
similar pattern can be seen in every European country, and in the United States as well 
       In Japan it is this model of party politics more than the reality that is “backward.”  
Japanese reformers are in a hopeless quest for the “modern” political party and party 
system that was modern seventy or more years ago but that is not modern anymore.  And 
as long as this model is held up as defining the goals of political reform, reform is bound 
to fail and Japanese cynicism about the country’s political system bound to remain 
pervasive.  
 
Reforming the Electoral System 
 
       In modern Japanese political history the primary target of political reform has been 
the electoral system.  From 1925 to 1993, with the sole exception of the first post-World 
War Two election, Japanese lower house elections were held under a multi-member 
district, single-entry ballot system, which in western usage is usually referred to as an 
SNTV (single non-transferable vote) system. Criticism of this system has a history almost 
as old as the system itself, and with each succeeding political scandal the belief that this 
system was responsible for Japan’s political problems grew ever deeper.          If only Japan could replace the SNTV system with a single member district systems, 
advocates of reform argued, those problems would be resolved. There would be no more 
factionalism, money politics, powerful special interests, candidate rather than party 
oriented election campaigns, and an emphasis on personality rather than policy.  
       By the early 1990s this view had become so widespread, and was so relentlessly 
promoted by the mass media, that it became nearly impossible to debate the merits of the 
case against the SNTV system. It no longer was possible to claim to be a proponent of 
political reform without supporting abolition of SNTV. 
              There were many reasons, however, to doubt that this system was the cause of 
Japan’s political problems.  There was even more reason to question whether abolishing 
it would make things better.  Personality and constituency service are important in US 
House of Representative elections. Factions have been important in Italian politics.   
Sweden, India and other countries have had the experience of long periods of one party 
dominance.  Yet none of these countries  used the Japanese  SNTV system.  This suggests 
that there must be other causes for factionalism, one party dominance, and candidate 
oriented election campaigns.  But Japanese reformers were not willing to consider that 
the election system might not be the culprit.  
              Even intra-party competition, supposedly the key feature and shortcoming of the 
SNTV system, also had far more complex causes than critics of the election system were 
prepared to consider. The truth is that a system that combines single entry ballots and 
multimember districts does not necessarily cause intraparty competition.  It does so only 
when a party can reasonably expect to elect more than one candidate in a district.  Even 
during the period of LDP one party dominance there was no LDP intra-party competition 
in those urban districts where the party, because of limited public support, ran only one 
candidate.  Intraparty competition in the Socialist Party ceased not because the system 
changed but because public support for the JSP declined to the point where the party 
could not run more than one candidate per district. 
              If instead of abolishing the SNTV, political reformers had insisted on rectifying 
district imbalances to equalize the weight of every citizen’s vote, then the representation 
of rural districts would have been substantially reduced and the LDP would have been 
able to run multiple candidates in relatively few districts.  A one person one vote apportionment amidst declining popular support for the LDP might well have led to the 
emergence of a competitive, moderately pluralistic party system under the SNTV system. 
              The change of the electoral system to a mixed system of single member and 
proportional representation districts is moving Japan toward a two party system, but it has 
brought about far less in the way of reform than the proponents of system change 
anticipated.  Elections are still constituency-service oriented and candidate dominated.  
Especially in the case of the LDP, the prevalence of the sons of retired Diet members 
who are successful in winning their fathers’ seats is testimony to the power of personal 
connections in Japanese electoral politics.  There is no longer intraparty competition, but 
candidates continue to rely on their personal koenkai rather than on party organization to 
run their campaigns. Major parties continue to be umbrella-type organizations for 
politicians whose views on important policy issues vary.  And the differences between 
the LDP and the Democratic Party, and the Komeito for that matter, are difficult to 
discern.  The history of Japanese politics under the new election system suggests that the 
impact of electoral systems on party systems is less important than many people believe. 
At least it is fair to say that the impact of this particular change in the electoral system has 
had far less of an impact in curing the supposed ills of Japanese politics than its advocates 
argued it would have.  
       If the SNTV system had not been abolished, however, people to this day would be 
arguing that it is the cause of Japan’s political problems.  Now that it has been changed, 
there seems to be little support for changing it once again, even though many people who 
had argued for the introduction of the sixed system of single member and proportional 
representation districts appear to have lost their enthusiasm for it.  For better or worse, 
Japan is likely to live with this system for some years to come. 
       How it will affect political behavior in the long run is hard to forecast.  As more and 
more politicians with no personal experience in the SNTV system enter the Diet, 
campaign practices may change. Elections may become more policy oriented.  But that 
would have happened under the SNTV system as well.  It is not the electoral system but 
rather basic changes in Japanese society and in Japanese people’s attitudes and values 
that are driving changes in voting behavior. The declining importance of factions and the growing importance of the popularity of the party leader in affecting voting behavior 
were observable phenomenon in the 1980s when the SNTV system was still in effect. 
 
The Manifesto Boom 
 
       The most recently popular issue for political reforms chasing the elusive goal of 
party dominanted and policy focused elections is the introduction of the so-called party 
manifesto. 
       Manifesto is another term for political platform or election promises but by writing it 
in katakana it seems to suggest something new and foreign and profound.  If parties and 
party leaders adopt manifestos, according to the proponents of the manifesto movement, 
then voters would be able to decide what party to vote for based on concrete policy 
promises. Elections would become battles between parties proposing different manifestos. 
At the next election voters would be able to judge how true the party in power had been 
to its manifesto.  And if it had failed to carry out its promises, then the voters could hold 
it accountable.   
       In other words, once political parties and party leaders issue their manifestos, politics 
will become party rather than personality centered, and issues and principles rather than 
constituency service ad opportunistic compromise will dominate political debate. If this 
sounds familiar, it is because the goal of the political reformers who champion the 
manifesto movement is to realize the ideal model of party politics that has been the goal 
of political reform back to the Taisho period.  Since electoral system reform did not 
accomplish that task, now manifestos will. 
       It is important to emphasize that there is no democracy in the world that operates in 
this way.  In the United States when the Democratic Party or the Republican Party holds 
its national convention to nominate its presidential candidate, it also convenes a platform 
committee to prepare the party’s policy agenda.  This platform is always a product of 
compromise. Party zealots try to get extreme demands into the platform.  The presidential 
candidate’s supporters often try to get more centrist language into it in order to appeal to 
floating voters or they play up some demand for radical change that is popular with a core 
constituency, knowing fully well that it has little chance to become government policy.  The idea that the party’s presidential candidate decides what his party’s platform is going 
to be and the party’s members in Congress then simply implement his promises has no 
base in political reality. 
       Discussions of party politics in Japan and especially of how to strengthen the power 
of the party president tend to exaggerate the power of the American president. The 
president is not nearly as powerful as many Japanese seem to believe he is.  Indeed, the 
writers of the American Constitution endeavored to devise a system that would prevent a 
concentration of power in the presidency.  The president’s power, in the words of Richard 
Neustadt, whose book Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents is the authoritative 
study on the American presidency, is the “power to persuade.”  A leader in a democracy 
needs to persuade his party, his parliament, and his public of the need for the policies he 
is advocating.  Persuasion takes many forms and the president, or prime minister, has 
access to many different techniques to persuade others to do as he wishes. Arm twisting, 
legislative compromises, the effective use of the mass media, and the firing of disloyal 
cabinet ministers are some of them.  A platform or manifesto may also be part of the 
process of persuasion, but it is not the end of it. 
       Modern  party  politics,  whether  in  Japan or the United States or elsewhere, are 
dominated by parties that cater to diverse constituencies and that seek the widest possible 
support.  The major parties in modern democracies agree far more than they disagree on 
basic policy issues, and if they are after majority support, their supporters invariably seek 
to serve plural and in some ways contradictory interests.   
              Modern parties, in other words, in Japan and elsewhere, are teams of individual 
political entrepreneurs banded together to seek political power.  Their candidates are 
elected by voters from different kinds of constituencies, of different ages, with different 
levels of income, and so on.  When voters go to the polls in a national election, they are 
not engaging in a policy referendum.  They are choosing a team to rule in the best 
interests of the people who elect them.   
              Many factors go into making that choice. They include issues of candidate 
personality, party leader image, the performance of the incumbent government, and the 
existence or absence of a credible alternative. Knowing what policies the party wants to 
adopt is one of them, and to the extent that the manifesto movement may get parties to be more explicit in defining their policy goals, it will provide information that voters can 
take into account at election time. But it is unrealistic to think that it can amount to more 
than that. 
       Politicians and parties have to stand for something to be sure.  As a politically savvy 
US Senator, Everitt Dirksen of Illinois, said many years ago, only half tongue in cheek, it 
is absolutely critical for politicians to have principles. “And my first principle,” he 
quickly added, “is flexibility.” Prime Minister Koizumi made a campaign promise to 
keep the ceiling on deficit financing of the government budget to under 30 million yen. 
And he was right when he dismissed criticism that he had failed to keep his promise by 
saying well, it is no big deal, it was only an election promise after all.  The question that 
should be asked about Koizumi is not whether he kept his promise on the deficit ceiling 
but whether he has performed adequately as prime minister in dealing with Japan’s 
economic problems.  Leaders need to be judged not by their fidelity to their election 
promises but by how well they govern. 
 
Japan’s “Anti-Politics” Tradition 
 
 Democratic politics is a messy and contentious business. It involves compromise.  It 
involves struggle between interest groups seeking access to the public purse, between 
bureaucrats who believe they know what is in the national interest and politicians who 
know what is in their reelection interest, between the party or parties in power and the 
political opposition.           
Democratic politics is frustrating and rather inefficient since it is based on compromise 
among contending political forces, a process that takes time and usually results in policies 
that leave everyone somewhat dissatisfied.  But in Japan this essence of politics is often 
dismissed as “backward” and even immoral.   
       There is a long tradition of what amounts to a kind of “anti-politics” in Japan. This 
often results in reformers putting forth an idealized, antiseptic model of modern politics 
as a yardstick against which to measure Japanese performance, which of course always 
comes up short.  Thus some new dramatic, fundamental reform is needed to purge the system of politicians who focus on constituency rather than national issues, on parties 
that appeal to personality rather than policy, and so on and so forth. 
       In short, the problem with a lot of the reforms that are regularly proposed to improve 
Japanese politics is that they deny politics itself.  In the end, the model of political 
behavior that seems to be so popular in Japan is the model of an idealized bureaucratic 
state.  It is a state in which the push and pull of politics, in which conflict itself is largely 
missing.   
       In democracies, however, politicians have an obligation to serve the interests of their 
constituents.  The parties to which they belong embrace a variety of viewpoints.  The 
leaders they elect are not all-powerful but have to convince their parties’ members to 
support their policies.  Political reform that seeks to deny these realities of modern 
politics is doomed to fail. 
       In thinking about political party reform in Japan, it is important to consider how 
party politics has changed since the early years of the twentieth century.  When political 
parties first emerged as important political institutions, more or less at the beginning of 
the last century, they represented the interests of particular groups in society.  Political 
parties were the representatives in the political realm of the interests of the working class, 
the bourgeousie, and so on.   
       The political history of the past century in modern democracies has been a history of 
the movement of political parties away from representing discrete social groups to 
occupying an intermediate position between society and the state. Political parties do not 
belong to any particular societal groups; they “belong” to the politicians who run them, 
and these politicians use the party to appeal to voters for support so that they can obtain 
political power. 
       In other words, there is a political market in which politicians are entrepreneurs and 
voters are consumers. Politicians are in the business of politics, and politics is a business. 
When voters go to the polls they are acting as consumers in the political marketplace.  
Political parties are organizations that compete in this marketplace for voter support.   
Some parties are niche parties. They are not after majority support but want to maximize 
their support among a relatively small group of people. They are something akin to a boutique or speciality shop as contrasted with a supermarket or department store. In 
Japan, the Komeito and the Japan Communist Party, are such niche parties. 
       But parties, such as the LDP and the Democrats, that seek majority support, must 
have a marketing strategy that can appeal to large numbers of voters who have diverse 
interests and values.  They try to do so in various ways.  Presenting attractive leaders is 
obviously one, and it is of growing importance in Japan.  The ability of a candidate to 
convince voters that he can do more for the constituency than can the candidate of 
another party is another important sales technique.  The continuing strength of the LDP is 
precisely that so many of its candidates are able to convince voters that their election will 
bring more benefits to the constituency than could be expected if someone else were 
elected.    
       The point is not whether the emergence of the catch-all party is a good thing or 
whether it is desirable that being a professional politician has become a business.  The 
point is that, whether one likes it or not, this is the political reality of modern democracies. 
Political reform to be relevant should be aimed at making this system work in as even 




       In this context there are two issues that are especially important areas for reform in 
Japan. One is the relationship between the ruling party and the government. The other is 
the relationship between the parties and the bureaucracy. 
       It is obviously difficult for voters to decide whether or not to vote for a particular 
party if the leader of that party commits himself to policies that the majority of the party’s 
Diet members oppose. The lack of unanimity within parties and the need for the party 
leader to deal with opposition from within his own party is a feature of politics in the 
United States and other countries as well as Japan. But what makes the Japanese situation 
unique is that the prime minister’s own team - the cabinet and the party’s top officials - 
are not necessarily loyal to the prime minister and his policies. In the United States 
Republican President George Bush cannot simply announce his policy goals and expect 
that the Republican majorities in the Senate and the House will make them law.  He has to negotiate and compromise with the legislative leaders of his own party.  But if any 
member of President Bush’s cabinet or key officials in the White House were to publicly 
criticize the President’s policies, that person would be out of his job that same day.  This 
is not, however, how things work in Japan.   
       The idea that the ruling party and the government are somehow equal and separate 
has a long history in Japan.  In the Westminister model of parliamentary democracy, 
when a party comes to power its key members join the government. Those who do not 
agree with the prime minister’s policies stay out of the government or they suppress their 
criticism and accept the prime minister’s policies as their own.  When the government 
submits legislation to the parliament, the party’s members vote for it.   
              In Japan the situation is not quite the same.  The obligation of the party’s Diet 
members to support the government in the Diet is recognized, and in this sense is very 
much in accord with the Westminister model.  There is strict party discipline in Diet 
voting and it is rare for a party member to go against the party.  But what makes Japan 
unique is the role played by the party’s Executive Council and Policy Affairs Research 
Council before legislation reaches the Diet.   
       The government has an obligation, not by law but by custom, to get the approval of 
the LDP’s Executive Council before submitting legislation to the Diet.  Apparently this 
convention was introduced originally to increase the party’s power vis-à-vis the 
bureaucracy. But in recent years, especially after Koizumi came to power, it has become 
a mechanism to increase the party’s power vis-à-vis its own leader, the prime minister. 
              The result has been the emergence of a dual power structure between the prime 
minister’s office and the LDP.  This not only makes governance almost impossibly 
difficult. It also makes it very difficult for the public to hold the government accountable 
for its policies.  If people believe that Prime Minister Koizumi is trying to do the right 
thing but is blocked by the opposition forces  in his own party, then the inclination is to 
continue to support Koizumi even though he has failed to achieve his goals.  If people are 
opposed to what Koizumi is trying to do and support the views of the opposition forces, 
then the inclination is to continue to support the LDP in order to prevent Koizumi from 
carrying out his reforms.  In either case the end result is a vote for the LDP.        There is no easy solution to this problem, in part because the tradition of regarding 
government-ruling party relations as somehow relations between equals has such a deep 
history in Japan. It is actually somewhat analogous to the relationship between the 
President and the Congressional members of the President’s party.   
        The answer to this problem is not to make unrealistic demands for unanimity among 
all LDP Diet members. It is understandable why politically Koizumi would argue that if 
the party elects him as president it is committed to support his policies.  But electing a 
president is not the same thing as giving up all control over policy making to the 
president.  A strong political leader is someone who has the ability to convince his party 
to support his policies. An inability to do so amounts to a failure of leadership.  It cannot 
be overcome by making unrealistic demands on party members to do whatever the party 
president wants to do.  The prime minister should be able to insist, however, that every 
member of his governing team, which includes cabinet ministers, vice ministers, 
parliamentary secretaries and the key party officials, be loyal to him and to his policy 
agenda. 
       In Japan the tradition of collective responsibility of the cabinet is deeply rooted. 
Cabinet decisions are made on the basis of unanimity.  Cabinet ministers tend to see 
themselves rather than the prime minister as the ultimate decision maker on issues that 
fall within their ministries’ jurisdiction. Moreover, vice ministers and parliamentary 
secretaries are not even chosen by the prime minister or by the minister but by the party’s 
secretary general.  Decisions as to who gets appointed to these posts remain based on 
considerations of seniority and factional affiliation. It is obviously exceedingly difficult 
for a prime minister to govern if his ministers do not believe they have an obligation to be 
loyal to the prime minister’s policy agenda and if the vice ministers and parliamentary 
secretaries do not regard themselves as part of the prime minister’s team to begin with. 
       Even more problematic is the relationship between the party’s three top officials and 
the prime minister.  It is not unusual for the head of the Executive Council or the Policy 
Affairs Research Council to openly criticize the prime minister’s policies and his cabinet 
appointments. Nor is it unusual for these party leaders to use their positions to block the 
prime minister from submitting legislation to the Diet. In other parliamentary systems the 
party leader being the prime minister would not tolerate such behavior and would summarily remove these party officials from office. Even more importantly, in other 
parliamentary democracies, party members who have fundamental differences over 
policy with the prime minister would not want to stay part of his government.   
              There have been suggestions made in Japan that key party officials should hold 
simultaneously positions in the cabinet.  Given the history of relations between 
government and ruling party in Japan, this proposal seems to make a great deal of sense.  
If the head of the Policy Affairs Research Council and the Executive Council and the 
Secretary General were in the cabinet, then when they spoke out on policy issues, they 
would have to represent the views of the cabinet.  If they did not do so and took a 
contrary position, the prime minister would have little choice but to dismiss them from 
the cabinet, and thus from their party post as well. 
              Restructuring the relationship between the prime minister’s office and the ruling 
party is one of the most important tasks for political reform in Japan.  Once a party comes 
to power, the capable leaders in it should become part of the government. Until this rather 
common sense feature of parliamentary democracy becomes practice in Japan, the kind 
of stand-off between Prime Minister Koizumi and the opposition forces in the LDP and 
the blurring of the lines of responsibility and accountability will continue. 
 
Politicians and Bureaucrats 
 
       The second important area for reform involves relations between political parties and 
the bureaucracy.  This is far too complex an issue to discuss in detail here.  The basic 
points are these. In the past the bureaucracy served as the ruling party’s think tank.   
Political leaders had a great deal of confidence in the bureaucracy’s competence and were 
able to coordinate policy making to insure that their political interests would be met.  For 
a variety of reasons, confidence in the bureaucracy has declined and the coordination 
mechanism that smoothed relations between the LDP and the bureaucracy has largely 
collapsed.  As a consequence, the issue of how to structure relations between politicians 
and bureaucrats has taken on a new urgency. 
       The idea that politicians rather than bureaucrats should make policy is regarded as a 
truism in contemporary Japan.  There are many politicians who pride themselves on being policy experts and knowing more about complex issues than bureaucrats 
themselves.  However, there are two fundamental problems with the argument that 
politicians rather than bureaucrats should make policy. 
       One problem is that most policy is technical and politically uninteresting.  Politicians 
should be spending their time dealing with and thinking about bigger issues. It is 
important to have a bureaucratic system in which the day to day business of running 
government is handled efficiently and without political prejudice by professional 
bureaucrats.  This requires high morale, competent people, and political support.   
Constantly bashing the bureaucrats and reducing their numbers is hardly a way to make 
such a system work. 
       Even more important is the point that for politicians to make policy they need to have 
expertise on a wide variety of issues.  If they are not to rely on bureaucrats to provide it, 
they need to get it elsewhere.  In the United States, the Congress has its own bureaucracy 
which in effect competes with the bureaucracy in the executive branch under the 
President.  In the US and in European countries as well, there is a well developed array of 
think tanks that provide alternative policy ideas to the bureaucracy.   
       Moreover, in several European countries political parties have their own think tanks 
that are a source of policy ideas for the prime minister and for the party in opposition as 
well. In Japan each Diet member is provided with a budget to hire one policy secretary, 
but one has to wonder how useful it is for each member of the Diet to have one staff 
member responsible for policy when the issues the Diet votes on are so various and when 
how one votes is so severely constrained by party discipline.  It would seem to make 
more sense to take the money being spent on policy secretaries and divide it among the 
parties to be used for hiring a professional policy staff to be attached to the party’s policy 
affairs council. 
       In any event, political leadership does not mean that politicians should be doing what 
bureaucrats normally do.  Political leadership means setting direction, identifying 
priorities, making critical decisions, and explaining to the public why particular policies 
are needed.  And it is to this end that political reform should be directed.  Changing for 
example the law regulating public subsidies to parties so that at least part of the subsidy 
would have to be used at party headquarters to support the party’s research staff might be worth considering.  Strengthening the professional staffs of Diet committees by bringing 
in experts from the private sector on a rotating basis might contribute to make the Diet 
more important as a site for policy making rather than just policy approval. 
     In the end, however, probably the most significant reform in terms of transforming 
Japanese politics would be the adoption of an election districting system for the lower 
house that strictly followed a one person one vote apportionment.  The imbalance in the 
weight of the vote between urban and rural districts is a major source of the problems 
Japanese politics face. If the lower house were to more accurately reflect the Japanese 
voting public, it would provoke party reorganization and it would change the policy 




       My purpose here is not to lay out an agenda for political reform.  My objective has 
been to describe how the ideal model of modern party politics that is so fervently 
embraced in Japan is a relic of the past with surprisingly little relevance to the real world 
of politics in twenty-first century Japan.  Japan faces serious political problems.  Reform 
to be successful has to be rooted in Japan’s historical and institutional realities and has to 
focus on concrete, incremental, realistic goals.  Party politics in Japan, after all, have a 
hundred year history.  The democratic tradition goes back beyond the American 
Occupation to the period of Taisho democracy.    Reforms that deny the power of this 
history and that seek to change Japan’s political culture in a day are bound to fail.  
       The history of party politics in Japan until recently has been a history of adaptability 
to changing circumstances. For the past decade, however, the political system’s capacity 
to adapt has been insufficient, to say the least. Whether it is able to demonstrate once 
again that adaptability and flexibility depends in large part on whether political reformers 
will let go of an outdated model of modern party politics and focus on concrete ways to 
strengthen the Japanese system rather than seek to fundamentally replace it. 